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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper interrogates the relationship between national courts and arbitral tribunals to
understand the jurisdictional tensions therein present. It examines the arbitral process
to determine the separate spheres of influence of courts and arbitral tribunals and where
these influences intersect. It also examines whether these two clearly defined systems of
adjudication can symbiotically co-exist and cooperatively interact in the same space. The
analysis leads to the conclusion that such co-existence is possible and is in the best
interest of both systems if they wish to thrive. This paper then notes that jurisdictions
whose laws and courts pursue a cooperative interaction between both systems are
generally perceived as being supportive of arbitration. It argues that such perception
attracts international arbitration disputes to those jurisdictions as seat; while the story is
very different in jurisdictions that are not so perceived; they do not attract many
international arbitration references as seat. 
This paper therefore draws two major conclusions: first, for arbitration and litigation
to thrive, both must accept the symbiotic nature of their relationship and strategically
share space with confidence and trust and with the clear purpose of supporting each
other in their own clearly defined spheres of influence; and second, for those
jurisdictions wishing to attract more international arbitration references (as seat), not
only do they need to modernize their arbitration related laws, but their courts must
become supportive of the arbitral process. The analysis of these issues will draw from
both qualitative and quantitative research that is already in the public domain including
examination of the provisions of relevant legislation and conventions, judicial decisions,
the views of legal commentators, and various statistics relevant to arbitration. The main
arbitration law referenced in this paper is the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, 1985 (amended in 2006) (Model Law). The Model Law has
been adopted or adapted by 103 jurisdictions in 73 countries, 10 of which are in Africa.1
* Senior Lecturer in International Commercial Law, SOAS University of London.
1. The African states are: Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tunisia, Uganda,
Zambia and Zimbabwe. For the text and status of the Model Law, see the UNCITRAL website at:
<www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html>
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This paper first examines the issues over which national courts and arbitral tribunals
have sole jurisdictions, those issues over which their jurisdictions overlap and how these
are regulated under various laws (II). It then examines the link between the perception
of arbitration friendliness or support of a jurisdiction and the attractiveness of the same
jurisdiction as a seat for international arbitration (III). 
II. JURISDICTION OF NATIONAL COURTS AND ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS IN ARBITRATION
As is well known, arbitration is an alternative adjudicative mechanism to litigation for
the resolution of disputes.2 Arbitration as a private process entails that the decision
makers in the process are private individuals, not officers of a state such as national
judges.3 These private individuals constitute the arbitral tribunal and they make final and
binding decisions (duly recognized under the laws of most nations) over a particular
dispute submitted to them by particular disputants.4 National court judges perform the
same judicial, decision-making function. Thus, as recognized by Mustill and Boyd,
arbitrators are private judges.5 It is this status accorded arbitrators and the decisions they
make over the substantive dispute under various national laws that raises the tension
between arbitral tribunals and national courts.6 This tension is on the basis that both
judges and arbitrators make binding decisions over disputes submitted by parties to
them, albeit in different fora.7 In addition, arbitrators now resolve major high-value
(last accessed 30 January 2017).
2. The semi-formalized nature of modern arbitration makes it therefore plausible to perceive of
arbitration as “private litigation” as against the court process of public litigation. The Queen Mary
International Arbitration surveys have consistently shown that commercial parties prefer
arbitration. In their 2006 survey, 76 per cent of the respondents preferred arbitration. In 2008, 88
per cent of the respondents have used arbitration. In 2013, most respondents (52 per cent ) still
prefer arbitration while in 2015, 90 per cent of respondents still prefer to use arbitration. The
Queen Mary University of London International Arbitration Surveys are all available online at:
<www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/research/index.html> (last accessed 8 April 2016). 
3. Interestingly Art. 37(1) of the Arbitration Rules of the East African Court of Justice (EACJ)
provides that arbitrators shall be appointed from among the judges of the EACJ. This is not the
norm even for supranational courts that also provide arbitral services. An example is the OHADA
Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA), the Rules of which clearly state that the CCJA
does not itself resolve disputes but appoints arbitrators. See Art. 2(2) CCJA Arbitration Rules.
4. UNCITRAL Model Law (2006) defines arbitral tribunal in Art. 2(b) as “a sole arbitrator or a panel
of arbitrators”, and in Art. 2(c) defines court as “a body or organ of the judicial system of a State”.
5. Michael J. MUSTILL and Stewart C. BOYD, Commercial Arbitration, 2nd ed. (Butterworths 2001)
p. 220. 
6. Such tension does not exist in non-adjudicative alternative dispute resolution processes, such as
mediation. This is because mediators do not make, but assist the parties in making (binding)
decisions over their dispute. So in effect the powers of the mediator are not comparable in status
to those of a judge of a national court. Thus there is no cause for rivalry.
7. An example of this tension was evident in the call for a rebalancing of the two systems (arbitration
and litigation) in England by the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd in 2016. The Lord
Chief Justice’s views also stimulated some lively debates beyond the shores of England. At the
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disputes and this exercise of power over such large disputes may evoke some degree of
disfavour (or at best a sense of competition) with the judiciary.8 
Arbitration laws in various jurisdictions usually set out the powers of arbitral tribunals
and in some jurisdictions the same law also sets out some of the (supervisory) powers
courts can exercise over arbitration within their jurisdiction.9 Generally, a clear
demarcation marked by the formation of the arbitral tribunal can be said to exist. For
example, national courts exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to the dispute,
short of determining the substantive issues, before the formation of the tribunal. For all
matters arising following the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, including determining
the substantive dispute, the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction. Following the publication
of the arbitral award and the arbitral tribunal becoming functus officio, national courts
decide all matters arising from the reference, such as enforcement of the final award.
These divisions can also be conceived of as power “movements” or “shifts”.10 This is a
very broad description and there are matters that do not neatly fall within one or another
of the zones.11 This section will examine the tasks solely performed by national courts
in arbitration (1); and the tasks performed solely by arbitral tribunals (2) to identify their
separate spheres of influence; and finally identify the tasks over which they both share
jurisdiction (3).
1. Sphere of Influence of National Courts in Arbitration
The courts of a particular country become relevant to an arbitration reference connected
to it. Such connection may be as tenuous as one party approaching the court for some
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (CIArb) London branch AGM on 28 April 2016, The Hon Sir
Bernard Eder in his keynote address titled, “Does Arbitration Stifle the Development of the Law:
Should Sect. 69 be Revitalised?” argued against the view that arbitration was stifling the
development of common law.
 8. See for example Susan FRANCK, “The Role of International Arbitrators” (2006) p. 1 available at:
<https://international-arbitration-attorney.com/wp-content/uploads/Microsoft-Word-ILW-
ILSA-Article.docsfranck2.pdf> (last accessed 8 April 2016).
 9. An example is the 1996 English Arbitration Act (EAA) Sects. 42-45. The text of the English
Arbitration Act 1996 is available at: <www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/23/data.pdf> (last
accessed on 7 April 2016).
10. I used the word “shift” to describe these power movements in Emilia ONYEMA, “Power Shift in
International Commercial Arbitration Proceedings”, 14 Caribbean Law Review (2004, nos. 1 and
2) pp. 62-77. An electronic copy of this article is available at: <http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/4425/>
(last accessed 7 April 2016). 
11. For example, emergency arbitrator mechanisms and post award actions (correction, interpretation
and making additional awards) by arbitrators. 
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assistance;12 it being the court of the seat of arbitration;13 or of the place where
recognition and enforcement or annulment of the award is sought.14 It is of course
debatable whether the courts of other countries may have jurisdiction over an arbitral
reference not otherwise connected to them as described. Examples include the courts
of the country of the substantive law of the transaction or where assets are located for
purposes of interim measures.15 This debate does not affect the discussion in this paper
so that national courts refer to courts in any jurisdiction connected to an arbitration
reference. 
The UNCITRAL Model Law expressly provides in Art. 5:
“In matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene except where so
provided in this Law.”
Art. 5 of the Model Law therefore makes it quite plain that for Model Law
jurisdictions, precedence is given to the arbitral tribunal to decide those matters
contained in it except where expressly stated. The Model Law also expressly provides
in Art. 6 those matters over which designated national courts (or other authority) shall
have jurisdiction.16 Such intervention is also expressly stated to be for the purpose of
“assistance and supervision”. Again evidencing the intention of the drafters of the Model
Law as it relates to the role of courts in international arbitration: to support and not
hinder the arbitral process. The matters over which national courts can intervene are:
to give effect to the arbitration agreement; appoint arbitrators; decide arbitrator
challenge applications; enforce or refuse to enforce orders for interim measures granted
by the arbitral tribunal; grant interim measures; terminate the arbitrator’s mandate;
finally determine the arbitrator’s jurisdiction; take evidence; enforce arbitral awards; and
set aside arbitral awards. This list further evidences the desire of the drafters of the
Model Law to give to the arbitral tribunal full control over the arbitral process and to
12. An example is in the National Iranian Oil Company v. State of Israel dispute where the French courts
assisted the Iranian party by appointing the arbitrator despite the dispute or arbitration agreement
not having any connection to France. For the English text of the decision see 11(2) Mealey’s
International Arbitration Review B5 (1996). 
13. See for example Arts. 34(2), 35 and 36 Model Law; Sects. 2 and 3, EAA. See also for example
Julian D.M. LEW, Loukas A. MISTELIS and Stefan M. KROLL, Comparative International
Commercial Arbitration, (Kluwer Law International 2003) (henceforth Lew, Mistelis and Kroll) p.
107.
14. See for example Art. V of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 1958 (New York Convention). Text and status of the New York Convention is available
at: <www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html> (last
accessed 30 January 2017). 
15. See for example Sect. 22B of the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, Chapter 609, E.R. 2 of 2014
(HK Ordinance) on the enforcement by the courts of Hong Kong of a relief granted by an
emergency arbitrator. See also Art. 17H Model Law on the recognition and enforcement of
interim measures issued by an arbitral tribunal. 
16. The matters are covered by Arts. 8, 11(3), 11(4), 13(3), 14, 16(3), 17H, 17I, 17J, 27 and 34(2)
of the Model Law. For more details see the travaux preparatoire available on the UNCITRAL
website already mentioned above.
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ensure minimal interference by national courts.17 Thus court intervention is limited to
the early stages of the arbitral reference (prior to and in aid of the proper constitution
of the arbitral tribunal) and following the conclusion of the reference when the award
is rendered, with possible interference during the arbitral proceedings (when the
arbitrator is challenged, assist with taking evidence and granting interim measures to
preserve the subject matter of the arbitration). 
The Model Law therefore envisages a national court assisting with the constitution of
the arbitral tribunal, following which the tribunal will be left in peace to determine the
dispute and make an award which the court can assist with enforcing or setting aside.
These clear provisions ensure that the spheres of influence of these decision-makers are
reasonably clear cut and well defined.
Under English law, the 1996 Arbitration Act (EAA) goes a couple of steps further
than the Model Law.18 The EAA makes detailed provisions on the powers English courts
can exercise over arbitration references. The Act commences by stating as one of its
general principles that “the parties should be free to agree how their disputes are
resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest”.19 
It then borrows from the Model Law the general caveat limiting court intervention
except as provided in the law.20 The EAA notes that even where a court may intervene,
the court can exercise its discretion and decide against such intervention. An example
is under Sect. 2(3) for forum non conveniens purposes. The EAA grants English courts
powers or jurisdiction to stay legal proceedings in favour of arbitration; extend time to
commence arbitration; appoint and remove arbitrators; determine the arbitrator’s
jurisdiction; make supportive orders; extend time to make awards; among others.21 
Under the Arbitration Law of France, there are even fewer opportunities (in
comparison with the Model Law) for courts to intervene. For example Art. 1448
provides:
“Where a dispute subject to an arbitration agreement is brought before a court,
such court shall decline jurisdiction, except if an arbitral tribunal has not yet been
seized of the dispute and if the arbitration agreement is manifestly void or
manifestly not applicable.”22
This provision makes it clear that a court can act before the constitution of the arbitral
tribunal and also in cases where the arbitration agreement is manifestly void. It therefore
17. See the preparatory documents for the Model Law available at <www.uncitral.org/uncitral/
en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_travaux.html> (last accessed 30 January
2017).
18. See for example Sects. 42-45 of the EAA.
19. Sect. 1(b) of the EAA.
20. Sect. 1(c) of the EAA.
21. These are provided for in Sects. 9-11; Sect. 12; Sect. 17(3) and (5); Sect. 18; Sect. 23(5), Sect.
24; Sect. 32; Sects. 42-45; Sect. 50 of the EAA.
22. Art. 1448(2) provides that French courts cannot decline jurisdiction suo moto. A party must make
a request to the court which follows the provisions of Art. II(3) of the New York Convention.
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settles any ambiguity in favour of arbitration. It also avoids the New York Convention
confusion of whether it is for national courts to examine whether the arbitration
agreement is “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed”, before
referring the parties to arbitration.23 Section 6 of the Singapore International Arbitration
Act 2012 also clearly empowers the court to determine whether the arbitration
agreement is valid before referring the parties to arbitration.24
Art. 1446 of the French Arbitration Law gives parties the freedom to submit a dispute
pending before the courts to arbitration.25 There is similar provision in the Ghana ADR
Act of 2010.26 These provisions imply that the well-known principle of parties losing the
right to take advantage of their arbitration agreement where they have “taken steps in the
proceedings”, may not be applied. Under French law, the courts can assist disputants to
appoint and remove arbitrators, take evidence, grant certain interim orders, recognize
and enforce the award, or annul the award.27 It is instructive that the caveat, “the judge
acting in support of the arbitration” is included against the powers granted to courts in
most of these provisions under the French law. Such caveat is a helpful reminder to
French courts and judges of the purpose of their role in arbitration.
National courts have the sole jurisdiction to recognize and enforce or set aside/annul
arbitral awards. National laws clearly provide the standards and grounds parties need to
23. For the position under Indian Law whose courts have been known to enquire into the validity of
the arbitration agreement under this article, see: Avatar SINGH, Law of Arbitration and Conciliation,
8th ed. (Eastern Book Company 2007) pp. 414-416. Art II(3) of the New York Convention
provides: 
“The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the
parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of
the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed.”
24. Sect. 6(2) Singapore International Arbitration Act, Chapter 143A of 2012. The text of this Act is
available at: <http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/download/0/0/pdf/binaryFile/pdfFile.pdf?Com
pId:dd9f0294-66ec-4d80-ac95-b40c1be85915> (last accessed 11 April 2016).
25. On the law of arbitration in France, see generally: Jean ROUCHE, Gerald H. POINTON and
Jean-Louis DELVOLVE, French Arbitration Law & Practice: A Dynamic Civil Law Approach to
International Arbitration, 2nd ed. (Kluwer Law International 2009) and Emmanuel GAILLARD and
John SAVAGE, eds., Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer
Law International 1999)
26. Sect. 7(1) Ghana ADR Act 2010 goes further by empowering the court to refer parties to
arbitration even where there is no arbitration agreement in existence. The section provides:
“Where a court before which an action is pending is of the view that the action or a part of the
action can be resolved through arbitration, that court may, with the consent of the parties in
writing, despite that there is no arbitration agreement in respect of the matter in dispute, refer the
action or any part of the action for arbitration.” 
See for a critique of this provision, Emilia ONYEMA, “The New Ghana ADR Act 2010: A Critical
Overview”, 28 Arbitration International, (2012, no. 1) p. 101 at pp. 113-115. 
27. See Arts. 1452, 1453, 1454, 1456(3), 1463(3), 1468, 1469, 1516 of the French Arbitration Law.
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satisfy for their courts to recognize, enforce, set aside, annul or remit an arbitral award.28
The New York Convention which has 156 parties, 35 of which are African States,
specifically empowers national courts to recognize and give effect to arbitration
agreements and recognize and enforce or set aside/annul arbitral awards.29 Art. II(3) of
the New York Convention expressly refers to the “court of a Contracting State” while
the obligations under Arts. III and V both refer to the “competent authority” with the
primary obligations contained in those articles reposed in the Convention State. These
obligations are performed by national courts in the vast majority of the Member States
of the Convention.30
So for the Model Law (and its jurisdictions) the relevance of the state playing a
supportive role is to enable the parties to actualize their promises as contained in their
arbitration agreement. Such promises include effectively commencing arbitration when
a covered dispute eventuates. Most national laws through their provisions, clearly
envisage the arbitral tribunal taking charge of the arbitral proceedings when it is
constituted. Therefore national laws empower the arbitral tribunal to determine the
substantive disputes between the parties and all consequential matters towards making
such decisions. Such matters include, managing the proceedings; taking evidence;
determining what weight to attach to the evidence; deciding the issues in dispute
between the parties; deciding liability of the parties and the remedies to award; allocating
costs and interest. These matters therefore fall outside the domain of national courts.
2. Sphere of Influence of Arbitral Tribunals
Arbitral tribunals on their part become relevant when they have been constituted in a
particular reference. By constitution is meant the appointment and acceptance of
appointment of all arbitrators forming the arbitral tribunal.31 The powers of the arbitral
tribunal are also, by virtue of the choice of a seat, connected to a particular jurisdiction.32
It is generally accepted that the powers and jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals are subject
28. See for example Arts. 34, 35 and 36 of the Model Law; Sects. 66, 67, 68 and 69 EAA; Arts. 1516
and 1519 French Arbitration Law. 
29. These powers are contained in Arts. II(1), III and V of the New York Convention.
30. Art. III of the New York Convention provides for the recognition of arbitral awards while Art. V
provides grounds on which such awards may be refused enforcement.
31. See Emilia ONYEMA, International Commercial Arbitration and the Arbitrator’s Contract, (Routledge
2010) pp. 84-102. 
32. Such connection counters the idea of “floating” or totally delocalized arbitrations. For some
commentaries on the delocalization and transnational theories, see, Jan PAULSSON, “Arbitration
Unbound: Award Detached from the Law of the Country of its Origin”, ICLQ (1981) pp. 358-
387; Hong-Lin YU, “Explore the Void: An Evaluation of Arbitration Theories, Part 2”, 8 Intl ALR
(2005, no. 1) pp. 14-22; Julian LEW, “Achieving the Dream: Autonomous Arbitration”, 22
Arbitration International (2006, no. 2) pp. 178-203; Ahmed MASSOUD, “The Influence of the
Delocalisation and Seat Theories Upon Judicial Attitudes Towards International Commercial
Arbitration”, 77 Arbitration (2011, no. 4) pp. 406-422; Jonathan MANCE, “Arbitration: A Law
unto Itself?”, 32 Arbitration International (2016, no. 2) pp. 223-241; and Emmanuel GAILLARD,
Legal Theory of International Arbitration (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010).
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to the mandatory requirements of the law of the seat of arbitration.33 The law of the seat
also acts as a gap-filler for matters not provided by the parties or which they have not
agreed upon. It therefore guides the arbitral tribunal on what powers it can exercise over
the dispute within that particular jurisdiction. Needless to say, such power differs from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. However, some degree of convergence is beginning to
emerge in international arbitration laws.34 The powers of any arbitral tribunal can
therefore be found in the arbitration agreement between the parties, any set of
arbitration rules adopted by the parties and the provisions of the law of the seat of
arbitration. 
Most international arbitration disputes are subject to a set of arbitration rules which
may be for administered or non-administered references. In this section, examples will
be drawn from the UNCITRAL (2010 revision),35 ICC (2012),36 LCIA (2014),37 SIAC
(2013)38 and KIAC (2012)39 Arbitration Rules to give a flavour of the powers exercisable
by arbitrators.40 The arbitral tribunal has general autonomy over the arbitral
proceedings. This includes determining the conduct of the proceedings, including case
management, taking of evidence, granting interim measures of protection, hearing the
parties, deciding the issues in dispute and making the award.41
33. See Gary B. BORN, International Commercial Arbitration, volume 1 (Kluwer Law International
2009) at p. 306 and p. 1765; LEW, MISTELIS and KROLL, supra, at p. 120. But see Emmanuel
GAILLARD and John SAVAGE, eds., Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial
Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 1999) pp. 633-636.
34. It is arguable that this convergence is strongly driven by institutional rules which themselves
“codify” arbitral practice, especially international arbitral practice.
35. For the text of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976 with revisions in 2010, see:
<www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-
e.pdf> (last accessed 15 April 2016).
36. International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) available at: <www.iccwbo.org/about-
icc/organization/dispute-resolution-services/icc-international-court-of-arbitration/> (last
accessed 15 April 2016).
37. London Court of International Arbitration available at: <www.lcia.org/> (last accessed 15 April
2016). 
38. Singapore International Arbitration Centre available at: <www.siac.org.sg/> (last accessed 15
April 2016). A new set of SIAC Arbitration Rules was launched in May 2016 at the SIAC 2016
Congress and Golden Jubilee celebration, with details on the SIAC website.
39. Kigali International Arbitration Centre, available at: <www.kiac.org.rw/> (last accessed 15 April
2016).
40. The 2015 Queen Mary International Arbitration survey lists the ICC, LCIA, HKIAC, SIAC and
SCC as the five most preferred arbitration institutions. KIAC is representative of arbitration
institutions in Africa. It is recognized that most arbitration rules are modelled after the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in addition to it being used for ad hoc or non-administered
references.
41. See for examples: Arts. 17-39 UNCITRAL Rules; Arts. 17-28, 31-32 and 35 ICC Rules; Arts. 14-
23, 25-28 LCIA Rules; Rules 16-19, 21-29 and 31 SIAC Rules; and Arts. 26-33, 35-38 KIAC
Rules.
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Some issues on which arbitration rules are beginning to converge are the competence
of the arbitral tribunal to determine its jurisdiction in the first instance;42 grant interim
orders of protection to preserve the res of the arbitration;43 join third or non-parties to
the arbitration agreement;44 consolidate arbitral proceedings;45 manage the arbitral
reference;46 take and allocate weight to the evidence of the parties;47 decide the dispute
between the parties;48 and make an arbitral award binding on the parties.49 So arbitral
tribunals effectively have full control over the proceedings, subject only to the agreement
of the disputing parties and to a lesser degree the decisions of the particular arbitration
institution (if any) whose arbitration rules apply to the dispute.50
3. Shared Jurisdiction Between National Courts and Arbitral Tribunals 
There are however some issues in arbitration over which national courts and arbitral
tribunals share jurisdiction. States in their national arbitration laws grant powers over
these issues to both the arbitral tribunal (through the disputing parties) and national
courts. It will be interesting to interrogate whether over these issues, national courts and
arbitral tribunals have concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. Put a different way, does
this mean that once the arbitral tribunal has made a decision on the issue, national courts
must respect the decision and cannot therefore override the decision made by the
tribunal? It is arguable that this will be the position on those issues mentioned above
(under II.2), over which the arbitral tribunal is granted sole authority to decide. Thus,
national courts lack jurisdiction to entertain applications over such matters. For example,
Sect.34 of the EAA expressly states “It shall be for the tribunal to decide all procedural
and evidential matters, subject to the right of the parties to agree any matter.” It follows
that for such matters, there is no concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction between national
42. See for example Art. 23 UNCITRAL Rules; Art. 23 LCIA Rules; Rule 25.2 SIAC Rules; and Art.
31 KIAC Rules.
43. See for example Art. 26 UNCITRAL Rules; Art. 28 ICC Rules; Art. 25 LCIA Rules; Rule 26
SIAC Rules; and Art. 33 KIAC Rules.
44. See for example Art. 17(5) UNCITRAL Rules; Art. 22.1(viii) LCIA Rules; Rule 24.1(b) SIAC
Rules; and Art. 32.3 KIAC Rules. Under Art. 8 KIAC Rules, the KIAC Secretariat can also make
this decision. Under the ICC Rules, the ICC Court makes this decision pursuant to Art. 7 of the
ICC Rules.
45. See for example Art. 22.1(ix) LCIA Rules. Under Art. 11 KIAC Rules, the KIAC Centre makes
this decision. Under the ICC Rules, the ICC Court makes this decision pursuant to Art. 10 of the
ICC Rules.
46. See for example Art. 17(1) UNCITRAL Rules; Art. 22 ICC Rules; Art. 14 LCIA Rules; Rule 16
SIAC Rules; and Art. 28 KIAC Rules.
47. See for example Art. 27 UNCITRAL Rules; Art. 25 ICC Rules; Art. 22.1(vi) LCIA Rules; Rule
28.3 SIAC Rules; and Art. 28 KIAC Rules.
48. See for example Art. 33 UNCITRAL Rules; Art. 31 ICC Rules; Art. 22.3 LCIA Rules; Rule 24
SIAC Rules; and Art. 38 KIAC Rules.
49. See for example Art. 34 UNCITRAL Rules; Art. 31 ICC Rules; Art. 26 LCIA Rules; Rule 28.2
SIAC Rules; and Art. 39 KIAC Rules.
50. For example, arbitration institutions may decide the seat of the arbitration and the fees of the
arbitrators.
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courts and the arbitral tribunal. If there is any such jurisdiction, it will be between the
disputing parties and the arbitral tribunal. This is because arbitration laws generally
empower disputing parties to agree some of these issues, for example, agreeing the seat
and language of the arbitration. For some other matters, practicality of performance
requires agreement between the parties and arbitral tribunal, for example, fixing the
timetable for the hearings; while other matters, such as the weight to be attached to the
evidence adduced by the parties, fall within the sole jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal
to decide. National courts do not have powers to entertain (least of all overturn)
arguments on the decision of the arbitral tribunal over such matters. 
To some degree, that is the same position with the arbitral tribunal’s finding of facts
in the substantive dispute. This explains why generally there is no appeal mechanism in
arbitration,51 similar to that in litigation; but a challenge mechanism on limited or
circumscribed grounds. However, where for example, an arbitrator is challenged and
the arbitral tribunal52 determines the challenge in the first instance, with a national court
making a final determination on the challenge, such a situation is clearly not one of
coordinate jurisdiction.53 The national court enjoys a superior jurisdiction to that of the
arbitral tribunal, and its decision overrides that of the initial decision-maker, be it the
arbitral tribunal, appointing authority or arbitration institution. The same can be said for
the award which can be confirmed, set aside or remitted back to the arbitral tribunal by
a national court. 
There are other issues over which both the arbitral tribunal and the court can make
a decision, for example, the grant of interim measures of protection. It should be quickly
noted that even over interim measures, the powers of the arbitral tribunal may be
limited primarily by the very nature of arbitration and the practicalities of the dispute.
The consensual nature of arbitration necessitates that the arbitral tribunal lacks powers
over non-parties to the arbitration agreement who have not submitted to its jurisdiction.
Therefore if the interim measure affects the rights or interests of a non-party, this may
limit the authority of the arbitral tribunal.54 The powers of national courts generally do
not have such limitations, subject to the question of territoriality.55 Another issue of
practical consideration is the urgency of the order sought. Where such an order is sought
quickly, it may not be practicable for the party to convene the arbitral tribunal for a
51. This does not refer to appeal processes within the arbitral mechanism for example under trade
arbitrations such as the Grain and Feed Trade Association (GAFTA) which operates a two-tier
arbitration system, for which see: <www.gafta.com/arbitration> (last accessed 23 February
2017).
52. Or the arbitration institution or appointing authority, as the case may be.
53. Under most arbitration laws the national courts finally determine challenges to arbitrators
regardless of who initially made the decision. Such decision-maker may be the tribunal itself,
appointing authority or arbitration institution. 
54. The word “may” is used here because the arbitral tribunal may achieve the same result through
personal orders made directly against the party before them over whom they have jurisdiction.
Arbitrators generally use such personal orders.
55. See however, Campbell MCLACHLAN, “Transnational Applications of Mareva Injunctions and
Anton Piller Orders”, 36 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1987, no. 3) pp.
669-679.
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hearing before the order is made. The same consideration will also affect the requesting
party’s need to surprise the other party with the order. An example is where the
requesting party wishes to stop the other party moving funds out of the jurisdiction. Such
an order clearly needs an element of surprise. But the need to observe due process
prevents the arbitral tribunal from conducting an ex parte hearing with one party to the
dispute in the absence of the other party. This effectively frustrates the urgency and
surprise elements of the order. The impact of these issues, which is exemplified in the
discourse on the ability of the tribunal to hear ex parte applications, is evident in the
UNCITRAL Working Group papers.56 The deliberations of this Working Group led to
the additional provisions in Art. 17 of the Model Law which provides for the arbitral
tribunal or national court to grant such measures: “Unless otherwise agreed by the
parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, grant interim measures.”
Art. 17 J on the other hand provides:
“A court shall have the same power of issuing an interim measure in relation to
arbitration proceedings, irrespective of whether their place is in the territory of
this State, as it has in relation to proceedings in courts. The court shall exercise
such power in accordance with its own procedures in consideration of the specific
features of international arbitration.”57
 
Therefore, expressly as it relates to those interim measures which an arbitral tribunal
by its nature can order, it can be said to have concurrent jurisdiction with national
courts. The effect of this concurrent jurisdiction is that a supportive court will assist the
parties by enforcing the order of the arbitral tribunal.58 An unsupportive court on the
other hand, will either not enforce the order or deny the arbitral tribunal of such
jurisdiction. 
The same analysis applies to situations where the arbitral tribunal orders the
appearance of a witness or production of documents. Under the laws of some
jurisdictions, the arbitral tribunal can directly make such orders which their courts will
enforce.59 In some other jurisdictions, parties need to seek such assistance for witness
production before national courts. Such access to the courts is very important especially
over witnesses that the arbitral tribunal does not have powers to summon. It is important
that since the onus lies with the presenting party to produce their evidence (and
witnesses) that they can access the courts to assist them with that task. Closely allied to
witness production is document production. The IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence
56. For Working Group II Papers on Interim Measures see the 32nd to the 44th available at:
<www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html> (last
accessed 15 April 2016).
57. Sect. 45 of the Hong Kong Ordinance dis-applies this Art. 17J of the Model Law while under Sect.
61 of the Ordinance; such orders granted by the arbitral tribunal will be enforced with leave of
the court. 
58. The English High Court in Gerald Metals SA v. Timis [2016] EWHC 2327 (Ch) considered that in
appropriate cases, it would defer to the LCIA emergency arbitrator procedure as provided for in
the LCIA 2014 Arbitration Rules.
59. See for example Sect. 56 Hong Kong Ordinance.
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in International Arbitration has greatly assisted with harmonizing practice on this
subject.60
States therefore anticipate that arbitral tribunals will decide the substantive issues in
dispute and the procedural matters connected to such decisions as consented to by the
disputing parties. In addition states generally allow their courts to intervene to varying
degrees with any arbitration connected to their territory. Such intervention may be prior
to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, during the arbitration proceedings and after
the issuance of the arbitral award. These interventions by national courts may be
necessary and supportive of the arbitration process. Supportive interventions by national
courts will facilitate the commencement of the arbitration process, its smooth
continuation and enforcement of the decisions made by the arbitral tribunal. Therefore
the tools provided for national courts to intervene in arbitration may be construed
positively as evidence of state support for the process of arbitration. Such tools may also
be construed negatively. As shown above, the same tools are generally available for court
support or negative intervention in arbitration in various jurisdictions. However, the
difference in categorizing the attitude of national courts lies in how these courts use these
tools.
There is no singular jurisdiction in the world that does not provide opportunities for
its courts to intervene in arbitration proceedings within its territory. However, the states
that are referred to as being “arbitration friendly” are those whose courts respect and
support the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal and the arbitral process. States whose
courts appear to not fully appreciate the role of, and sphere of influence of arbitration
within their legal system, are described as being unfriendly towards arbitration. Such
courts appear to compete for jurisdictional power and space with the arbitral tribunal,
thereby negatively intervening in the arbitral process. Such negative intervention
frustrates the right of choice of dispute resolution mechanism given to the disputants by
the same state, since both the executive, legislative and judiciary are different arms of the
same state or government. Such negative intervention by national courts in arbitration
references causes additional expense of time and money, frustrates the parties’ choice
of dispute resolution mechanism and greatly erodes users’ confidence in arbitration
generally and more particularly in such jurisdictions. 
III. LINKAGE BETWEEN SUPPORTIVE ARBITRATION JURISDICTION AND CHOICE OF SEAT
This section briefly examines the link between the perception by users of arbitration of
a jurisdiction as being supportive of arbitration, and the ability of such jurisdiction to
attract arbitration references as seat. It is generally recognized that a modern arbitration
regime includes: content of the arbitration law (whether it accepts and codifies party
autonomy and limited court interference, so generally meets the UNICTRAL Model law
60. For the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration 2010 and Commentary,
see: <www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx> (last
accessed 15 April 2016).
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minimum threshold); whether the jurisdiction is party to the New York Convention;61
whether the jurisdiction is home to viable and sustainable arbitration institutions;
whether the jurisdiction is home to qualified arbitration practitioners; and whether the
attitude of the courts is supportive of arbitration.62 This last factor shall be examined in
more detail under this section.
1. Popular Seats for International Arbitration
The traditional seats for arbitration as noted by several arbitration surveys (in different
orders) are, Geneva, London, New York and Paris. Examples from the Queen Mary
Surveys consistently list these cities. The 2006 Queen Mary Survey notes that, “the four
most popular venues were England, Switzerland, France and the United States of
America”.63 Data from the Queen Mary International Arbitration surveys show that in
2010, London, Paris, New York and Geneva were the seats most preferred by their
respondents with Singapore beginning to emerge as a “regional leader in Asia”.64 In their
2015 survey, London, Paris, Hong Kong, Singapore and Geneva were listed as the “five
most preferred and widely used seats”.65 Interestingly, on number of caseload, China can
be regarded as a major player with CIETAC recording a total of 18,078 cases between
2000 and 2015 of which 7,280 were foreign related and 10,798 were domestic cases.66
However from the Queen Mary survey, China was not mentioned as one of the top
destinations for international arbitration.67 The Queen Mary 2015 survey found that
parties chose seats primarily on the “reputation and recognition” of the seat and as a link
to the substantive law of the transaction. When asked the reasons for their preferences,
respondents to the Queen Mary survey chose, “neutrality and impartiality of the local
legal system, the national arbitration law, and track record of enforcing agreements to
arbitrate and arbitral awards” as their top three factors.68 This is all very useful data which
states wishing to attract more arbitration cases can use in formulating relevant policies.
Singapore was noted in the Queen Mary 2015 Survey as one of the popular (non-
traditional) seats for arbitration. This finding by the Queen Mary Survey is supported by
61. As listed by Sundaresh MENON, “Transnational Commercial Law: Realities, Challenges and a Call
for Meaningful Convergence”, Singapore Journal of Legal Studies (2013) pp 231 at 238-240.
62. The 2015 Queen Mary International Arbitration Survey at pp. 5, 11-17, found that their
respondents preferred certain seats because of their “appraisal of the seats established formal legal
infrastructure: the neutrality and impartiality of the legal system; the national arbitration law; and
its track record for enforcing agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards”. 
63. See “International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices 2006” at pp. 3, 14-15.
64. See “Choice in Arbitration” 2010 Survey, pp. 2, 17-20.
65. See “2015 International Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International
Arbitration”, pp. 2, 11-17. 
66. For details of CIETAC caseload, see: <www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Page&a=index&
id=40&l=en> (last accessed 6 February 2017). 
67. This anomaly raises various qualitative issues on the use of surveys for example the results being
very dependent on the location of the respondents. It also raises the question of what are the best
forms of measureable indicators for these types of enquiry. 
68. 2015 International Arbitration Survey at p. 13.
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recent data from the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) which shows a
year-on-year increase in its caseload of new cases, from 78 in 2004 to 222 in 2014.69
SIAC continues to review its arbitration rules with the latest revision of its 2013 Rules
in 2016.70 These reviews keep abreast with developments in arbitral practice so the Rules
meet the needs of its users. A very brief examination of the arbitration regime in
Singapore may help with understanding its rise to becoming a popular seat for
arbitration. Singapore (in addition to other policy changes) revised its International
Arbitration law in 2012 and though based on the Model Law, reflects greater court
support for arbitration.71 However, an explanation of the popularity of Singapore as a
seat for arbitration must go beyond these factors. This is because some other jurisdictions
that have also reviewed their national arbitration laws (and some have more than one
major arbitration institution with equally modern arbitration rules) have not garnered
such popularity or seen such increases in their arbitration caseload. I will suggest that the
role of the government and courts of Singapore in supporting arbitration, along with its
geographical location (serving the Australian-Asian markets) have also greatly impacted
on its emergence as a popular seat for arbitration. The government of Singapore and the
courts of Singapore have adopted clear policies to support the growth and development
of Singapore as an international centre for arbitration.72 This has led to greater marketing
of arbitration in Singapore and of Singapore to the international arbitration community.
In addition to the availability of first-class non-legal support services for arbitration,
Singapore has also put in place first-class legal services to support international
arbitration.73 
It must be noted that even for the traditional seats, their courts have not always made
“supportive” decisions over arbitration disputes. Two examples from England will
suffice: In the Jivraj v Hashwani litigation of 2009 where the English Court of Appeal
decided that arbitrators were employees of the appointing parties in interpreting EU
law74; the international arbitration community raised alarm over the decision of the
Court of Appeal (to the effect that arbitrators were employees) and made strenuous
“protests” in the media; with some institutions filing amicus briefs at the hearing of the
69. See the 2015 SIAC Annual Report at: <www.siac.org.sg/images/stories/articles/annual_report/
SIAC_Annual_Report_2015.pdf> (last accessed 15 April 2016).
70. SIAC also recently launched its Investment Arbitration Rules with effect from 1 January 2017. The
text of these Rules is available at <www.siac.org.sg/images/stories/articles/rules/IA/
SIAC%20Investment%20Arbitration%20Rules%20-%20Final.pdf> (last accessed 30 January
2017).
71. One example of such support is in Sect. 12. In 2016 further revisions came into effect; for
example Sect. 16 on the appointment of a conciliator.
72. See for an example of an article on this: <http://simc.com.sg/singapore-became-arbitration-
hub/> (last accessed 15 April 2016).
73. Such legal services include the increase in the numbers of international law firms with offices in
Singapore providing access to legal and other expertise for complex disputes.
74. The Employment Equality (Religion and Belief) Regulation, 2003. This Regulation prohibits
employers from discriminating against a prospective employee on grounds of religion.
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appeal at the Supreme Court.75 The decision of the Court of Appeal was reversed by the
Supreme Court to safeguard arbitration and the London arbitration market.76 The
intervention of the arbitration institutions (ICC and LCIA) must be commended. Such
intervention is necessary to protect arbitration and must be made (wherever possible)
in courts all over the world and not just in selective jurisdictions.
Again, in 2010, the English Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of
Appeal in Dallah v. Pakistan by refusing to enforce in England the arbitral award made by
an ICC arbitral tribunal sitting in Paris, though the same award was enforced by the
French courts.77 This was viewed as a decision that is not supportive of arbitration.
However these decisions did not negatively affect the continued choice of London as seat
of arbitration.78 This may point to factors other than just having a supportive judiciary
to attract arbitration as seat; or does this relate to the effect of arbitration users’
perception of a jurisdiction; so that when a jurisdiction is perceived as supportive, its
national courts can afford to occasionally give anomalous decisions on arbitration? This
clearly calls for some interrogation for a clearer understanding of why such decisions do
not adversely affect the reputation or choice of a traditional seat such as London as a top
destination for arbitration references.79 
2. Some African Jurisdictions
It will be remiss not to explore some African jurisdictions since the 23rd ICCA Congress
was held in Africa (Mauritius). This section briefly examines four African jurisdictions
whose national laws are based on the UNCITRAL Model Law; are parties to both the
New York and ICSID Conventions; and home to known arbitration institutions with
75. For a good summary of the issues and decisions in Jivraj v. Hashawani, see commentary by Olswang
LLP at: <www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d9baca5b-a5fd-4692-b7e8-a8243fd1c323>
(last accessed 15 April 2016).
76. See Jivraj v. Hashwani [2011] UKSC for the decision of the Supreme Court overturning the decision
of the Court of Appeal which is reported in [2010] EWCA Civ. 712.
77. The refusal was on the ground that the Government of Pakistan was not a party to the arbitration
agreement between Dallah and the Trust. See Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company v.
Ministry of Religious Affairs and Government of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46 for the Supreme Court
d e c i s i o n .  S e e  a  s u m m a r y  f r o m  W h i t e  &  C a s e  L L P  a t :
<www.whitecase.com/publications/newsletter/insight-dallah-paris-court-appeal-and-uk-
supreme-court-reach-contrary> (last accessed 15 April 2016). 
78. For example in 2014 the second most frequently chosen place for ICC arbitrations was London;
chosen in eighty-six cases. See ICC Bulletin (2015, issue 1) at page 14. 
79. Such interrogation will help dispel the view expressed in some emerging jurisdictions that
regardless of how “friendly” their arbitration regime becomes, international arbitration users will
still choose the traditional seats.
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modern arbitration rules:80 Nigeria, Rwanda, Mauritius, and Egypt. A brief mention will
also be made of the OHADA arbitration regime.81
Nigeria hosts one of the African-Asian Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO)
Regional Centres, the Lagos Regional Centre and at least one other major arbitration
centre, the Lagos Court of Arbitration Centre.82 Nigeria generates huge numbers of both
domestic and international commercial disputes. The Nigerian Arbitration and
Conciliation Act 1988 is based on the Model Law (1985 version) and its arbitration
institutions have modern arbitration rules.83 However Nigeria is not attracting
international arbitrations as seat. It is obvious that apart from a weak non-legal
environment, the systemic failures of Nigerian courts create a very weak judicial
environment which is not perceived by arbitration users as supportive of arbitration.84
There have been some very positive judicial decisions such as the Nigerian Supreme
Court decision in The Owners of the MV Lupex v. Nigeria Overseas Chartering and Shipping Ltd
upholding the arbitration agreement.85However, it is frustrating for parties to have to
appeal all the way to the Supreme Court of Nigeria for their arbitration agreement to be
recognized and given effect.
Rwanda has fared much better than Nigeria especially as a post-conflict state. Rwanda
has a modern arbitration law also based on the Model Law (2006 version) and a very
active and vibrant Kigali International Arbitration Centre (KIAC) supported by the
government of Rwanda. From statistics made available by KIAC, it has a growing
caseload and between 2012 and 2015 has administered twenty-eight cases with parties
from the United States of America, Italy, South Africa, Kenya, Pakistan, Rwanda, and
Senegal.86 
Mauritius on its part has first class non-legal facilities, a developed tourism industry
and a thriving global business industry. It is a Model Law (2006 version) jurisdiction and
home to the LCIA-MIAC centre which is described by a report on three arbitration
institutions in Africa commissioned by the African Development Bank, as having, 
80. For a list of seventy-two arbitration institutions in various African countries see:
<www.arbitration-icca.org/media/7/14403606533411/list_of_arbitration_institutions_in_
africa_-_emilia.pdf> (last accessed 30 January 2017).
81. OHADA refers to the “Organization for the Harmonization of Business Laws in Africa” created by
Treaty in 1993 and revised in 2008. For more information on OHADA see: <www.ohada.com/>
(last accessed 15 April 2016). 
82. Nigeria is home to at least two other arbitration institutions: International Centre for Arbitration
and Mediation, Abuja; and Lagos Chamber of Commerce International Arbitration Centre.
83. One example is the 2015 Arbitration Rules of the Lagos Chamber of Commerce International
Arbitration Centre (LACIAC) which is available at: <www.laciac.org/> (last accessed 15 April
2016).
84. Such systemic failures include delays in the judicial process and allegations of judicial corruption.
On delays see, Emilia ONYEMA, “IPCO v NNPC Saga and Liability of Nigerian Legal System”,
published in The Guardian Newspapers (Nigeria) of 22 December 2015 and also available at:
<http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/21653/> (last accessed 15 April 2016).
85. The Owners of the MV Lupex v. Nigeria Overseas Chartering and Shipping Ltd [2003] 15 NWLR (Part
844) 469.
86. For more details see: <www.kiac.org.rw/IMG/pdf/-25.pdf> (last accessed 15 April 2016). 
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“the potential to become a successful arbitration centre, as it is endowed with a very
modern set of arbitration rules, the Centre’s Registrar has responded to all requests for
information in a very professional and efficient manner, and the local arbitration law also
seems to meet all international standards”.87 
The government of Mauritius embarked on a clear policy initiative of making
Mauritius a destination for international arbitration.88 The Mauritian courts have adopted
this policy and can be said to be supportive of international arbitration. This is evidenced
from their decisions on arbitration and their specialist courts with final appeal to the
Privy Council in London.89 One recent example of a very supportive decision by the
Mauritius Supreme Court is the Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v. Unitech Ltd case.90 In this
case the Court enforced two LCIA arbitral awards in favour of Cruz City. The Supreme
Court of Mauritius used the opportunity to declare the constitutionality of the New York
Convention in Mauritius and its preference for a narrow public policy interpretation of
Art. V(2) of the Convention. Mauritius therefore has in effect supportive arbitral, legal
and non-legal environments for international arbitration to thrive. It is also suitably
located to attract disputes from Indian parties. An assessment on the basis of caseload
shows Mauritius is not yet thriving as a seat for international arbitration. This may be
because LCIA-MIAC is still a relatively young arbitration institution.91
Egypt on its part is home to the oldest AALCO regional centre in Africa, the Cairo
Regional Centre. Egypt’s national arbitration law is also based on the Model Law (1985
version) while the arbitration rules of the Cairo Regional Centre are based on the
UNCITRAL Rules.92 The caseload of the Cairo Regional Centre has grown year-on-year.
In their 2015 Annual Report, 54 new cases were filed with the Centre, bringing the total
of cases filed with the Centre to 1,070.93 Of these new cases, two were purely
international (between parties from Saudi Arabia, United States and UAE).94
87. See Werner JAHNEL, “Assessment Report of Arbitration Centres in Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt and
Mauritius”, a report prepared for the African development Bank, dated 10 April 2014 at p. 69 and
available at: <www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Procurement/Project-
related-Procurement/Assessment_Report_of_arbitration_centres_in_C%C3%B4te_
d%E2%80%99Ivoire__Egypt_and_Mauritius.pdf> (last accessed 15 April 2016).
88. For more details, see Duncan BAGSHAW, “The Experience of LCIA-MIAC” in Emilia ONYEMA,
ed., The Transformation of Arbitration in Africa: The Role of Arbitral Institutions (Kluwer Law
International 2016) pp. 95-108.
89. This is clearly geared towards reassuring foreign parties who need final decisions on their disputes
made by such a panel of decision makers.
90. Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v. Unitech Ltd and Others [2014] SCJ 100.
91. According to the LCIA website, LCIA-MIAC was established in 2011.
92. For more information on the Cairo Regional Centre see, Mohamed ABDEL-RAOUF and Dalia
HUSSEIN, “The Cairo Regional Arbitration Centre” in Emilia ONYEMA, ed., The Transformation
of Arbitration in Africa: The Role of Arbitral Institutions (Kluwer Law International 2016) pp. 61-74.
93. See the CRCICA 2015 statistics at: <http://crcica.org/FilesEnglish/Annual%20Report_2016-
10-31_09-26-47_0.pdf> (last accessed 06 February 2017).
94. This figure contrasts with 2014 when the Centre administered nine purely international cases with
parties from Kuwait, Lebanon, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sudan, Switzerland, and United
Arab Emirates. CRCICA 2014 Annual Report is available at: <http://crcica.org.eg/
pub_annual.html> (last accessed 15 April 2016).
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Understandably, the disputes filed with the Cairo Regional Centre are predominantly
from parties from the Middle East, North Africa (MENA) region.95 However it is noted
that the Centre has stepped up its engagement with countries of sub-Sahara Africa. For
example it appointed a Nigerian arbitration expert to its Board of Trustees in 2014.96
The Cairo Regional Centre remains a very active and engaged arbitration institution and
will play a major leadership role for other arbitration institutions on the continent, as it
shares its experience of administering arbitrations and participating in the global arbitral
space.
As it relates to the OHADA arbitration regime, there are arbitration institutions in
most of the seventeen OHADA member states and these have varying degrees of success
and operate in similar fashion to other private arbitration institutions.97 Within the
OHADA region, the states apply the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1999 (UAA) which is
currently under review. The UAA, though not modelled after the UNCITRAL Model
Law, provides for a relatively modern arbitral regime as the law of arbitration for the
member states.98 Arbitration under the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration
(CCJA) Arbitration Rules is unique.99 This uniqueness is based on the dualist nature of
the CCJA as the OHADA supranational court and final authority on OHADA uniform
acts. As an arbitration institution, the CCJA performs the same tasks and functions as any
other arbitration institution. However when the arbitral tribunal renders its award, the
same can be enforced or annulled by the CCJA (with no appeal to any other court).100
Over the years the CCJA has shown its support for arbitration through robust
enforcement of arbitral awards. However very recently, the CCJA annulled an arbitral
award (in keeping with its practice) where the arbitrators agreed higher fees with the
parties than was agreed by the CCJA.101 This action of the arbitral tribunal and the parties
was contrary to the mandatory provision in the CCJA Arbitration Rules, which binds the
 95. In 2015, CRCICA administered disputes involving parties from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon,
Libya, UAE, USA, Turkey, British Virgin Islands, Russia, Spain, Taiwan and the Cayman Islands.
Correspondingly, the arbitrators came from Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Tunisia, USA,
UK, Germany, France and Spain. 
 96. The appointee is Mrs. Olufunke Adekoya. This is in addition to Judge Abdulqawi Yusuf from
Somalia. See, Cairo Regional Centre 2015 Annual Report, at p. 14. 
 97. The seventeen OHADA member states are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central Africa
Republic, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea,
Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Niger, Republic of Congo, Senegal, and Togo. For arbitration
institutions in these jurisdictions see the list at: <www.researcharbitrationafrica.
com/#!arbitration-institutions-in-africa/lvi7c> (last accessed 15 April 2016). 
 98. See Boris MARTOR, Nanette PILKINGTON, David S. SELLERS, and Sabastien THOUVENOT,
Business Law in Africa: OHADA and the Harmonization Process, 2nd ed. (GMB Publishing Ltd 2007)
pp. 259-284.
 99. See Emilia ONYEMA, “Regional Arbitration Institution for ECOWAS: Lessons from OHADA
Common Court of Justice and Arbitration”, Int’l ALR (2014, issue 5) pp. 99-111.
100. See Mahutodji Jimmy Vital KODO and Narcisse AKA, “The CCJA as a Regional Arbitration
Institution” in Emilia ONYEMA, ed., The Transformation of Arbitration in Africa: The Role of Arbitral
Institutions, (Kluwer Law International, 2016) pp. 47-59.
101. See Republic of Guinea v. Getma International, decision of the CCJA of 19 November 2015. 
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parties to the fees set by the CCJA.102 This decision has drawn negative commentary
from the media103 and the wider arbitration community on its possible impact on the
development of OHADA arbitration.104 
An examination of the rankings of these African States in the World Bank Ease of
Doing Business Reports shows a clear connection between governmental regulatory
(in)efficiencies and growth of arbitration. Comparing the 2015 and 2016 Reports for the
World Bank Ease of Doing Business Rankings, Singapore ranks first out of 189
jurisdictions in both Reports. For the four African countries explored above, Mauritius
maintained its top ranking among African countries but fell from 28th in 2015 to 32nd
in 2016 in the world. Rwanda fell from 46th in the world in 2015 to 62nd in 2016, but
moved from 3rd to 2nd in Africa over the same period. Egypt fell from 112 in 2015 to
131 in 2016 globally and also lost ground within the continent from 12th in 2015 to 15th
in 2016. Nigeria however, ranked 170 in 2015 and 169 in 2016 in the global rankings
and among African countries moved from 42nd to 40th showing a very slight
improvement. As compared with the traditional seats of arbitration mentioned above
(London, Paris, Geneva), the United Kingdom was ranked 8th in 2015 and 6th in 2016
globally. France was ranked 31st in 2015 and 27th in 2016 while Switzerland was ranked
20th in 2015 and 26th in 2016.105 These bare comparisons suggest a connection between
the governmental regulatory environment of each country and its ability to attract
international arbitration references as seat. It therefore appears the African States will
need major improvements in their regulatory environments in addition to modernizing
their laws and signing up to the relevant conventions, if they wish to attract international
arbitration references as seats.
This paper has argued that if international arbitration users perceive a jurisdiction as
being supportive, such jurisdiction will attract international arbitration references as seat.
Published statistics on traditional seats for international arbitration primarily based in
Europe and the United States of America support this thesis. As applied to emerging
jurisdictions, there is evidence to show that the same is true. However, the question that
needs to be examined is how a supportive jurisdiction is defined. As shown above,
Singapore meets the classic definition of a supportive jurisdiction. Rwanda is a small (as
is Singapore) post-conflict state with a lot of reconstruction on-going. The role played
by the government with a clearly defined business-friendly policy appears to support and
complement the work of the Kigali International Arbitration Centre. Mauritius is in the
102. It should be noted that the CCJA is empowered to fix a higher rate of fees for arbitrators under
Art. 24(3) of its Arbitration Rules.
103. See for example, a Newspaper article at: <www.jeuneafrique.com/285543/societe/affaire-
getma-guinee-les-arbitres-repondent/> (last accessed 15 April 2016).
104. See commentary from Herbert Smith Freehills at: <http://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/2016/
01/19/ohada-ccja-court-annuls-e38-million-arbitral-award-against-guinea/> (lst accessed 15
April 2016). Getma unsuccessfully applied to enforce the annulled award before the courts in the
United States. See for example, the decision of the District Court of Columbia in Getma
International v. Republic of Guinea, Civil Action No. 2014-1616 (D.C. 2016).
105. See the World Bank Doing Business Reports: 2016 “Measuring Regulatory Quality and Efficiency”;
and 2015 “Going Beyond Efficiency” available at: <www.doingbusiness.org/> (last accessed 15
April 2016).
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same position. However, these two African jurisdictions are not recording the same
successes as Singapore, so there is a need to investigate this further. 
It appears that in addition to providing a supportive legal environment (modern laws,
ratification of relevant conventions, supportive courts, and availability of legal expertise);
and non-legal services (first-class hotels, ancillary hearing facilities, easy access to and out
of the seat, among others); the geographical location of a seat and the stage of economic
development or growth of the state or region are equally important.106 These factors are
relevant for states wishing to attract international arbitration as seat to also consider.
However, the strength or degree of the relationship between the existence of these
services and the numbers of international arbitrations hosted by the seat needs further
interrogation which goes beyond the remit of this paper. The Queen Mary 2015 Survey
concludes that “reputation and recognition are decisive factors when selecting a seat”, as
a result of which traditional seats will remain popular because of the perception that their
legal systems are neutral and impartial, with effective national arbitration laws and courts
with a track record of enforcing arbitration agreements and arbitral awards.107 The key
task before emerging arbitral seats in Africa is whether users of international arbitration
will one day also perceive them in those terms. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Arbitral tribunals act in a different sphere than national courts; however, they both are
in the same business of resolving disputes. There appears to be a growing convergence
in arbitration laws on matters over which the arbitral tribunal has greater decision-
making powers, issues on which national courts have overriding powers, issues in which
both national courts and arbitral tribunals enjoy truly concurrent jurisdictions, and finally
those issues over which national courts have sole power and control. However the
interpretation and implementation of these laws differ in various jurisdictions. This paper
argued that there is a link between the perception of international arbitration users on
how supportive a jurisdiction is of arbitration and the ability of that jurisdiction to attract
international arbitration as seat. It raised other possible connecting factors showing that
there is need for further research to clearly identify the factors that constitute the support
of a jurisdiction for arbitration. The result of such research will set out principles which
those states wishing to become destinations for international arbitration can adopt and
implement to hopefully begin to change the perceptions of users of arbitration on the
support for arbitration by those states and the attendant benefits of such perception.
106. Other factors that may be relevant to this question are the size of the country involved and
location of international law firms.
107. Queen Mary 2015 International Arbitration Survey, pp. 11-15.
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